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2Introduction
Intra-state conflicts are not a new phenomenon. Since 1945
they have been more frequent and more violent than inter-state
warfare (SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook, 1998: 13-25). With the end of
the Cold War these tendencies exuberated following mostly in the
lines of ethno-national and separatist-armed conflicts, bringing a
significant shift in the perception of security issues and alternative
approaches to it, especially in Europe. In particular, the changing
dialogue of sovereignty, identity and security and international
responsibility appears to be increasingly significant. Considering that
the prepositions in IR depend on both empirical validity and logical
soundness a theoretical exercise on the case of intra-state conflicts
questions the validity of the traditional state developed concept of
security. The path is open for new interpretations and understanding
of normative, operational and structural issues in contemporary
world politics.
Human and moral choices determined by the dialectics of
intra-state conflicts revealed to be inherent features of both social
and international order pressurizing upon the reorganization of the
conceptual framework and epistemological principles in which
security studies and conflict resolution processes are organized.
Obviously we are witnessing the opening moves in international
relations where the realist perspective of focusing on the security of
a particular state and the intrusion of liberal principles such as the
protection of fundamental human rights are part of the same process
although their coexistence still remains ambiguous and
controversial.
The paper will assess the inter-linkage between the intra-state
conflicts and the international answer and intervention to such
conflicts and its implication for the international relations and
security issues. The paper will take a closer look to the case of
Kosovo to find the applicability of the arguments raised on this
paper. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to reveal the large-
extended problematic, enumerate all circumstances and effecting
factors relevant to the case, neither detail all means and strategies
that can be used to resolve the cases. These limitations are done
with the intention of avoiding bulky whilst preserving cohesion and
consistency within the limits of a paper.
31. Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Post-Cold War
Order
The lenient end of the Cold War raised the expectations for an
“end of the history” of wars, especially in Europe (Fukujama 1990).
The peaceful dissolution of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
cheered the expectations. The brutality of the events in Yugoslavia
and other spots of the world brought the attention to intra-state
security situations and their implications.
The lessons from intra-state conflicts revealed that the traditional
schools of International Relations do not provide enough and
satisfactory tools for the understanding of " the current status of war
and peace in the international system" (Jung and Schlichte, 1999:
35). There is a tendency in the literature to cut up the reality in a way
that correspond to the practice the international affairs are organized
assuming states as actors acting in an anarchical ordering principle
and subject of security. Focussed on the state centric view security
remains a 'commodity concept' associated to power distribution and
related legacy effects to the international system of states, while
human and social dimension remain in a subordinating position
(McSweeny, 1999). Facing the dynamics of intra-state conflict this
fragmented analysis appears to be increasingly arbitrary and
revealing anomalies to the present security studies where there is
confusion as to the nature of the actors subject of security and the
relevance of domestic structures in the relations between the states
and to the security issues in the international system.
Coming from a quantitative generalization traditional
approaches does not count for the peculiarities of war events (either
it is bilateral or multilateral, general or regional, intra-state or inter-
state) and consequently in the peace building process the effect of
democratic norms on the strategic behavior of actors are
overemphasized while culture, social identities and cognitive
processes are ignored. (Maoz 1997) Going beyond traditional
understanding of the prospects of war and peace these factors
should be taken into account in the case of conflict understanding
and peace building processes.
Intra-state conflicts revealed not to be any more a state affaire.
The distinction between inter-state conflicts and intra-state conflicts
is becoming less clear, and it depends from which point of view you
are looking at the conflict. So, "if a province, an integrated portion of
the state's territory or a fraction of the population, refuses to submit
4to the centralized power and undertake an armed struggle, the
conflict, though civil war will regard to international war, will be
considered a foreign war by those who see the rebels as the
expression of an existing or nascent nation" (Aron, 1981: 7). And not
in few cases the state centric concept of authority and related
practices and strategies revealed to be detrimental in the sense of
scarifying other human values for those of sovereignty and territorial
inviolability. State desisted to be the protector of its citizens instead
turned into a security threat to them (Møller, 2000). Not always the
state can be personified and identified with its own citizens or
considered as the most optimal form of organization that in the best
of way looks at its own interests and security and of its own citizens
first and foremost. The state of citizenship…."is being jeopardized by
the trend toward national, sub-national and ethnic re-
territorialisation" (Hassner, 1993:129). The claims of different ethnic-
groups for self-determination in the face of minority oppression, was
transformed into conflicts involving disputes over autonomy and
sovereignty. The existence of the state is at stage but the threat this
time is not coming from hostile and enemy states but from within the
state itself. The dichotomy of self-determination and sovereignty is
perceived as the challenge of the post Cold War order.
The crisis and intra-state conflicts in the Balkans, in the last
decade were an expression of erosion of the state’s ability to deal
with the problems of its own citizens and developments in its
territory. The fierce break out of Yugoslavia and the continuation of
the dissolution is part of this eroding process. Abhorrent utterance of
extreme human rights violation as massive killings, ethnic cleansing,
and deportation of populations purposed to the territorial
dispossession were part of the process.  The answers of the
international society towards such developments have moved
beyond traditional practices, bringing "humanitarian and human
rights law closer to the forefront of modern conflict resolution
processes" and "interventions as an important response option
available to international society"(Ryan, 1997:77).
Solution and peace-building processes on the case of intra-
state conflict tend towards cultural integrity rather than territorial
integrity, promotion of the human rights versus self-determination in
short term and regional integration in long terms. Actually the acting
framework is not clear, an expression of such uncertainty is the
coexistence of two perspectives in the international practice: the
neo-realist perspective of focusing on the state as a central point of
5authority and the liberal perspective based on liberal principles of
universal respect for human rights and rights of self-determination,
which are meant to coexist as parts of the same process especially
in the peace building. In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, then Secretary
General of the United Nations did frame as such this controversial
existence:  "respect for state2 fundamental sovereignty and integrity
are crucial to any common international progress" even "the time of
absolute and exclusive sovereignty…. has passed; its theory was
never matched by reality" (Butros-Ghali, 1992).
1.1. Intra-state conflict and the nature of threats to security
Intra-state conflicts speak out for tensions that exist in the
internal realm of the state, while not all of them are a threat of
security to the existence of the state. When a group's security spells
insecurities for others, then it certainly constitute a serious ‘societal
security’ problem that can be translated as a threat to "sustainability,
within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of
language, culture and religious and national identity and
custom"(Buzan, 1991: 19).  This societal security dilemma may
escalate as far as it can go, to the exhaustion of the resources or the
elimination of one party through such abhorrent manifestations as
ethnic cleansing up to genocide or through weakening enormously
and especially causing irreparable damages on the participants. The
objective of such manifestations is the elimination of the other's
social existence, and that's why civilians, women, children and youth
as the seeds of society continuation and generation are the
preferred targets. The situation reveals "the collapse of the state
monopoly on the use of force and recognised social relations which
forces an ethnicization of society (Schoch, 2001:57). Under this
considerations "society is not just a sector of state security, but a
distinctive referent object along side it (Waever, 1993:26-27).
Nevertheless not all the internal conflicts even dissolution
movements can break out into war. Intra-state conflicts erupt in a
violent manner and become separatist movements, when they
"involve an armed confrontation between a sovereign independent
state and a regionally-based movement seeking to break away or
seeking an extended form of internal territorial self-rule" (Heraclides,
1997: 682). In essence they witness the complexity of the security
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6question as well as the linkage between state, social and human
security (Møller 2000:33), where "the state is at most a mean but
never an end in itself"(Møller, 1993:12)
Accordingly, social-security conflict threatens to become a
political security problem affecting the state in question, if it is
manifested in a struggle for secessionism challenging the
fundamental principle of its existence, sovereignty. Obviously the
events in one country would impact the other countries of the region
if "[r]egional security define a group of states, whose primary
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from an other".
From such perspective security is a complex concept, which implies
the security at the three levels: individuals, states and the
international system, complementarily "the security of each become
in part, a condition for the security of all" (Buzan, 1991:26-27).  To
sum up, "individual and global security are the two sides of the same
coin" (Møller, 1993:13).
1.2. Societal and Identity Security Dilemma
Intra-state conflicts jeopardise the societal relationships within
a multiethnic state. Obviously societal security concerns relate with
identity preservation as the process and practice that construct
peoples and groups self-image and perpetuate their group
existence. (McSweeney, 1999:69; Waever, 1993:25) Societal
security dilemma in most of the cases is translated as an identity
security dilemma.  In Buzan terms, "societies are fundamentally
about identity. They are about what enable a group of peoples to
refer to themselves as 'we'... The defining modes of 'we', 'us' and
'them' are all challenged by the formation of new identities, and the
movement of peoples carrying different identities" (Buzan, 1993: 5-
6).
Identity is a social "process of constructive negotiating,
manipulating or affirming a response to the demand -at times urgent,
mostly absent-for collective image". (McSweeney, 1999:78). Societal
identity is mainly defined in function of ethnicity and religion, which
"have acquired prominence.... because of their historical association
with the development of the modern state" (Waever, 1993:23).
Social identity speaks out differences depending on group
"intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution
of knowledge' that constitute...conceptions of self and others"
7(Wendt, 1992: 397). Spelling out collective differences do not self
generate security problems. Differences can be a source of
richness, dynamism and progress or vice versa depending on the
negotiated interest and collective norms whereabouts understanding
reveals the patterns of mutual responsiveness in the process of
interaction. Identity procreates a security dilemma when it is used as
a political leverage that reflects conflict of interests on the
preservation of power dominance and structure of relationship. The
conflictual interaction is manifests with the imposition of identity in
egoistic manifestations rather then co-operative one, "with the
ethnonational collective seen as the only guarantor of protection in
an increasing climate of fear" (Schoch, 2001:58). The escalation of
conflict leads to chain reaction effects, which promises
fragmentation. At this point the process speaks out security
concerns for the state since its sovereignty and territoriality are
threaten.
The conflictual interaction is legitimised by a historically
discourse that procures authority and legitimacy upon the applied
argument that interprets identity in function of the effects of
discourses of danger. Although the arguments are accurately
selected, historical past overemphasise the dramas and features
that will help national distinctiveness and will establish a culture of
resistance towards the 'others' in order to reclaim and reinhabit the
pretended land. Culture groups (i.e., ethnic, language and religious
groups) in particularity pay a primordial importance to the territory
since they are related to specific territories and habitats.
The net infusion of cultural factors with historical selective
evidence raises the hostility levels while reducing the likelihood of
non-violent conflict resolution opening the way ahead to war.
(Singer, 1970:166).  In most cases the cultural differences does not
line belligerence but they can be exploited successfully by elites to
mobilize support for war. Elite's can highly influence the redefinition
of national interests, inclining them towards the 'common good' by
using the authority of knowledge3 and formal institutions (Haas,
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presupposed modes of enunciation. Truth in knowledge is quite often dependent in
power. See Foucoult, (1984, 1990) for the power-knowledge relationship. As an
example can be the "Memorandum" issued by the Serbian Academy of Arts and
Science that provided the scientific guidelines for solving "the Srbian Question"
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81997)4. Each community is forced to believe that its well-being is
conditioned by the disadvantages of the other communities and that
they can make progress only at the others costs. Violence erupts
because of the radicalisation of the internal fears and suspicions
producing the counter-values of what previously existed, spelling out
fragmentation and disunity.  And that is exactly what happened in
the case of Yugoslavia.
2. Internal Dimension of Kosovo conflicts
After the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, Kosovo remained a simple province of Serbia, having
lost its autonomous status in 1991. The internal fragile internal
equilibrium that existed before the conflict is now in total jeopardy
and the parallel administration that existed as a de facto partition
has created ground for a de jure partition. The conflict that since
long ago existed among the Serb and Albanian community turned
into a real war. In Heraclides (1997) terms the causes that lead to
this situation are attributed to too many factors. They are of a
historical nature related with the drawing of the borders, of an ethnic
nature regarding the definition of nationality and citizenship and thus
the status of minorities and the status of autonomy, or of the internal
changes that are particular to multinational, multiethnic or multi-
religious states in the period of transition from a communist regime
that suppressed by force such conflicts without finding a real
solution to them. And in the case of Kosovo they all fomented the
way to conflict.
Kosovo technically is a province within the legal framework of
the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Albanians and Serbs have divergent historical perceptions, each
side claiming the primacy of its historic and cultural rights. The
Albanians trace their origins back to the Illyrians that descended in
the Balkans long before the Slavic populations. For the Serbs,
Kosovo is the historical cradle of the Serbian nation and the center
of the medieval Nemanja Empire. With the defeat of the Serb and
other Balkan forces including the Albanians, by the Ottomans at the
battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the Serbian independence was lost.
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as positive. Here his argument is used in more generalist terms, implying both
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9The Balkan wars 1912-1913 were successful in over-throwing
the Ottoman Empire almost completely from the Balkans. Serbia by
wining the war against Bulgaria expanded its territory to the east
including all of present day Macedonia and Kosova (Skendi 1967:
36-39). This configuration continued later in the successive
Yugoslav entities. In retrospect, cultural differences that emerged
from various religions proved to be an effective marker of national or
ethnic identity, which in turn, created distinctive customs, rituals and
beliefs that shaped the every day life of the citizens. This social
variety would be later one of the incentives to encourage and revive
Serbian nationalism, (Ledrer, 1963: 3-80) particular after the
eighties. In fact, the deterioration in interethnic relations is also due
to political, economic and social imbalances between the two
communities.
Compared with other nations in Yugoslavia, the Albanians had
a very different position. Little attempt was made to integrate
Albanians into Yugoslav society. Kosovo remained the poorest
region of former Yugoslavia, and has one of the highest birth rates in
Europe (nearly 3 percent) and a very traditional social and familial
pattern. Albanians had a second class position in the framework of
the Republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia (Malcolm, 1998: 66). Poor
living conditions, repression and the second class position of the
Albanians lead to the street demonstrations in the capital of Kosovo,
Prishtina in the 1960s. After harsh repression of the Albanian
demonstrations in the 1960s by the Yugoslav government, Kosovo
was given the status of the autonomous province in 1969, under the
terms of the 1974 Constitution it was given the status of autonomous
region with its own institutions.
The constitution of 1974 gave more power to the units by
decentralizing and delegating the power from the central authority of
the federation to the republics, where republics were identified with
the majority nation. This was the first step towards the new
nationalism that resulted in a "constitutional nationalism" and later
on completed the process of "ethnification" of communist policies
that had started during the 1970s (Hayden, 1992: 654-673). The
system prevented discussions on the national issues, suppressing
the national question by appeals for unification based on communist
ideology and dogmas, without taking into consideration all the great
differences between the nations and cultural traditions, the level of
economic development and patterns of social organization. The
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granting of the autonomy created tensions being considered
inadequate by both the Albanians and the Serbs.
Another important factor that arose from the tensions between
the two communities was the economic crisis that swept the over-all
structure of the Yugoslav self-management system during the 1980s
and the beginning of the 1990s. This deepened the already existing
gap in the relations among the republics. In theory self-management
was perceived as an appropriate instrument considering that the
economic response was going to abate the political crises (Sekelj,
1993). Economic problems affected different regions and nations in
different ways, providing a fertile soil for extremist movements. To
sum up, economic disparities between the regions, self-
management, decentralization reform and economic crises induced
regional economic nationalism within Yugoslavia (Pleskovic and
Dolenc, 1982). These features became exacerbated in the
framework of the Serb republic, because to the economic crises was
added a large increase in the Albanian population. The growing
dissent as a result of the economic difficulties led to a massive
exodus of the Serbs and Montenegrins towards Serbia and
Montenegro proper. In 1981, large demonstrations of Albanians
aimed at obtaining the status of Republic for Kosovo that ended, in
1989, in the annulment of the status of the autonomy and de facto
imposition to the Albanians of direct Serbian rule. This act was
followed by the proclamation of an Independent Republic of Kosovo
in September 1991 following a referendum in which 90 percent of
the population voted. The proclamation of the independence gave
life to the parallel shadow government of Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova
with his Gandhian-type policy, encouraged the parallel life, and
created a society of Albanian with separated political, cultural,
educational, health and media structures.  This political move aimed
at the avoidance of conflict with Serb authorities and gain support for
the international recognition of independence. This was a strategy
based upon the knowledge that forceful secessionist movements are
not justifiable under the present practices of the international law, if
the aim of international law is the preservation of the state.  In nature
this effort prevents de facto organic groups to be regarded as states
(Aron, 1981:120). In practice in other cases, such as the one of the
Biafra war the UN denied the request for secession.
Facing the dramatic changes in the framework of Yugoslavia
and their repercussions on Serbia the interests of communities in
the latter were generated in the process of reinforcing identity
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separateness.  Close analysis of the internal situation reveals that
the perceptions in the Serbian side are affected not only by nostalgic
considerations that perceive Kosovo as the heartland of Serb
nationalism, the issue on which Milosevic came to power and the
defeat caused his failure but also by fears that Kosovo could be the
first step of a long chain of secessions. That fuelled insecurities for
the future of the Serbian State and perspectives that would shrink it
to ethnic borders, leaving Serbs alone within their national state.
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia the Serb interests received
a great burst considering that "Yugoslav project and the Greater
Serbia project were... complementary to each other". Although
"Yugoslavia was never pro-Serbia, ... it provided two basic
guarantees" important for Serbian nation: the protection of the Serb
identity and safety under the Federation roof.  This logic justify the
dialectics of the situation " the more the Serbs insisted on living
together if Yugoslavia disintegrated, the more the northern republics
wanted to secede; ....more Serbians in the remaining Yugoslavia"
more it spurred secession. (Wiberg, 1993: 100-101). This situation
puts the question of Kosovo and Serbian perceptions in broader
context. The secession of Kosovo could precipitate similar claims in
Vojvodina and Sandjak by Hungary and Muslim minorities
respectively. (Clement, 1997)
Conflict and related security issues are relational concepts,
which not necessarily exclude power-based calculations on the side
of the political elite's (McSweeney, 1999: 15). At least in one
direction the dissolution of Yugoslavia paid on the favor of the
Serbs. In the framework of legal dissolution the equal distribution of
assets of the dissolving state by the successor states did not
unfortunately apply to the Yugoslav National Army (INA). This reality
gave to the Serbs the means to fight for their expansionist designs
or at least to stop the chain of fragmentation within Serbia (Aybet,
2000). "For almost a decade the Serbian nationalist movement ...
shoved it readiness to inflict death and human suffering in
demonstration of that power". Hardly the conflict can be attributed to
the clash between the Serb and Albanian nationalism, since Serbs
hold full power over Kosovo territory for almost a decade.
(Anastasijevic, 2000:58)
Rregional and international environment exert varying path-
dependent effect on the dominance of competing definitions of
ethnic community interests. Both sides in the conflict, Serbs and
Albanians, include outside political factors in their calculation, a
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further analysis of the external dimensions will be of help in better
understanding the case.
3. Regional Dynamics
The correlation between internal conflicts, their regional
dimensions and immediate environment is consequently an
important variable that should not be neglected in any case of intra-
state conflict understanding. In an amalgamate region as the
Balkans, neighborhood has a particular importance due to the
historic circumstances and sensibility towards minorities.
Historically, the relations in the Balkans have been conflictual,
shaped by historical border disputes, religious and ethnic
differences. This situation is mostly due to the peculiarities of Balkan
history. For a long period the Balkan nations were under overlapping
occupation that made identity, culture and territoriality blurred
realities
"The nations of the Balkans were not ‘natural’, in the sense
that no nation was created by God on the sixth day. They were
‘man-made’ - invented, constructed, imagined at different
times and in different circumstances. They evolved, they were
imposed, they were rejected, they were discarded, they were
lost, and they were revived. As they were difficult to define,
they did all they could to become more readily definable. They
resorted to accelerated cultural assimilation; they also
resettled, expelled and eliminated. They needed roots, they
relied myths; they sought territorial justifications in the past;
historical rights clashed with self-determination" (Pavlowitch,
1999: 333).
In search for borders Balkan communities were supported by
the Great Powers of Europe at that time that played an important
role in shaping the map of the Balkans, but the new states were a
“product of geopolitics and not ethnic considerations”(Danopoulos
and Messas, 1997).
The Balkans remain the only region in Europe where the
borders did not consider ethnicity. (Kissinger, 1994). In every Balkan
country the population is composed of various ethnic groups. The
treatment of ethnic groups that often have been characterised by
maltreatment, have been always an issue and an esxusse for
interfering in the territory of the others. A intra-conflict in the Balkans
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easily can turn into a catalytic war involving the whole region
following the legacy that domestic political unrests often result in
involvment in militarised disputes (Russett, 1990). The evolution of
the situation in Tirana, Athens, Sofia or Ankara is a determining
factor for regional stability, since the policy towards, or even
interference in the internal affairs of a country by their neighbours
could be a multi-act tragedy.
In the near neighborhood, the emergence of the Kosovo
question raised the Albanian question in the Balkans. An escalation
of the war in Kosovo risked involving the entire Albanian nation
possibly indicating unification. The intervention of NATO prevented
the spread of the conflict in the region playing somehow
Miloscievic's game that was for the preservation of the status-quo,
the integrity of Yugoslavia, in contrast to the KLA who wanted to
escalate the war in search for an indisputable independence of
Kosovo.
How much grounded are the fears for a greater Albania?
Historically since the Middle Ages, Albania has not constituted a
geo-political entity, even by irony it is “one of the oldest-established
populations in Europe. No people could be less ‘alien’ to the history
of the Balkans”(Malcolm, 1998:12). From the 1470s until the early
twentieth century, Albania remained under Ottoman administration,
where the land populated by ethnic Albanians was divided into
several Ottoman administrative units. In the period of 1881-1912,
which constitute the last period before the establishment of the first
Albanian state, the ethnic Albanians were split into the vilayets of
Kosovo, Shkodra, Monastir, Ioannina, including within them other
ethnic groups as Vlachs, Gypsies and Turks. Ottomans preferred
this administrative approach of dividing ethnic groups into different
and mixed administrative units as a way of reducing any risk of
national state-formation within the Empire (Malcolm, 1998:30-1).
Albanian nationalism and self-distinctiveness awakened very
late compared to the other nations of Southeast Europe due to its
integration within the Ottoman Empire’s life and commonly shared
faith. Threats to the territories inhabited by the Albanians brought up
an Albanian national movement that culminated with the creation of
the Albanian League of Prizren in 10 June 1878. The immediate
objective of the League was to prevent Montenegro, Serbia and
Bulgaria from annexing parts of Albanian territories by virtue of the
San Stefano treaty. Historically Albanians did not have “a common
religion or geographic centre, language remained the main bond
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between Albanian5 peoples”(Ch&B Jelavich, 1977: 225). With the
departure of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans, the region was
divided up among the Balkan states.  In the Balkan Wars of 1912
and 1913, Albanians were the last to establish their own nation-
state. The first Albanian State was created in 1913 as a kingdom
under the auspice of an heir of one the European dynasties. Its size
was about the size of the today's Republic of Albania. The Albanian
population that remained outside the state borders matched in size
and importance that of Albania proper, and majority were spread in
Kosovo and the rest in Macedonia, Montenegro and Northern
Greece (Troebst, March 1997: 24-27). Since 1912 to the present
day, Kosovo and its Albanian majority have been living under the
harsh Serbian rule that can be compared with that of an apartheid
regime (Roux, 1992).
The new Albanian independent state being small not only in
size but also in economic importance, has faced during all its
existence problems with its neighbors much bigger size and
economic importance, that have maintained a constant threat
towards its integrity. Accordingly, its policy towards the outside
Albanian ethnic population has not played an important leading role
in the direction of the unification of all Albanian population under the
roof of a proper state. Today, while the Albanian government has
recognized Kosovo's independence, de facto rather than de jure, the
question of Kosovo is not a priority for Tirana, which is too weak
economically, politically and militarily, and faced with a tough period
of transition (Clement, 1997:23). The attitude of Tirana towards the
Albanian question is more moderate than the Kosovar and
Macedonian Albanians (Moore, 1993). In Secretary of State
Albrights' evaluation “Albania is respected for its all-round support,
for the efforts it is making in unison with the international community
and the Contact Group, in particular to ensure that the criminal
policy pursued, against the Kosovo people is condemned and
denounced in the international arena, averting any act of
provocation and re-establishing the Albanian governing institutions
and national security in exemplary cooperation with the United
States, the EU, NATO and the OSCE” (April 1998). Not only towards
Kosovo but also FYR of Macedonia the new Albanian Government
favors a policy of non-interference and moderation, which is
received in different ways by the various tendencies within the
Albanian movement in Kosovo and Macedonia and leads to
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divisions within each of them. According to the Albanian Socialist
leader, Nano, the solution to the ethnic Albanians' problems in the
Balkans is not to redraw borders but to "make them irrelevant" by
"creating new ways of co-exsitance-- first of all among [ethnic
Albanians]-- so that we are seen as emancipated, democratic, and a
factor of stability in the Balkans… so no one will maltreat us as in
the past or look down on us". The freedom of movement through the
region is the best way to deflect nationalist calls for establishing a
"greater Albania" (Nano, December 1999).
Beside the fact that the Albanian speaking population does not
have any common experience in state building other factors are not
in favor of a great Albania. There is a disparity in the economic
development and standard of living among the different Albanian
communities, for which all parts are conscious. Albanians in
Macedonia are aware of being in better conditions that the other
Albanians. Furthermore, the opening of the borders has made clear
that the Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania come form
three different societies and political cultures, which will not be easily
integrated into a common state and union in practical terms would
mean power sharing that it is not that easily achievable  (Moore,
January 2001). And the Kosovars have made already clear time and
again that they are interested only in independence (Balkan Report,
15 and 20 December 2000).
The voices that fueled the fears that a peaceful separation of
Montenegro and the independence of Kosovo would somehow lead
to a new Balkan anarchy and the formation of an 'inherently wicked
Albania' were part of Milosevic propaganda machinery. But none of
these have "happened". Even in a possible secession of
Montenegro all the Yugoslav leaders Djukanovic, Kostunica, and the
Serbian Prime Minister-designate Zoran Djindjic have all stressed
that no force will be used if Montenegro chooses to go: This point
was also made by army Chief of staff General Nebojsa Pavkovic
(Moore, 2001).
The new era blowing over the Balkans with the new moderate
leaders that replaced the ultra-nationalist generation of dictators
spell out for optimism, need for change and for turning the black
page consumed in the Balkans during the last decade of the last
millennium.
16
4. Nature of humanitarian interventions and the
implications in the Kososvo case
4.1. An empirical evidence of the Kosovo case
The forceful disintegration of Yugoslavia increased the fears
that the conflicts will sweep through the region in waves of
secessionist movements of an ethnic nature. The conflict in Kosovo
was expected to have a catalytic effect, "threatening to involve
Albania, fracture Macedonia, and possibly even pull Greece and
Turkey into a war -- not that they don't already have their hands full
over a new crisis brewing in Cyprus" (Garfinkle, 1998). Furthermore,
the conflict could have other consequences. In Bill Clinton terms the
Balkans is an explosive area "they touch other difficult areas and
unless we can contain and ultimately defuse the ethnic hatreds in
that region they can embroil us… in a much larger conflicts" (Clinton,
4 Feb. 1999).  Such considerations right or wrong continue to affects
the policies adopted by the West, both for the Balkans and the post-
war peace-building process in Kosovo.
The break up of Yugoslavia and the international involvement
for solutions of the Yugoslav crisis had negative implications for the
independence of Kosovo. The "Conference on Yugoslavia" that was
hosted by Lord Carrington in 1991 established the European
Community Monitoring Mission that was embodied with the authority
of negotiating solutions for Yugoslavia. Badinter Committee that was
created in the framework of the Conference on Yugoslavia was set
to resolve the problems coming out of the break up process of
Yugoslavia. It decided that in case the majority of the constituent
parts of the Federation wanted to withdraw from it, they had the right
to do so and this was going to be considered an act of dissolution
and the Republics had the right of sharing the assets. Badinter
committee rejected the request of Kosovo for independence in the
same process as the other republics because it was not endowed
with sovereignty.6
The other issue that was resolved by the Badinter committee
was the settlement of the borders. Uti Possidetis was applied as
                                                
6 The Kosovo Albanian leadership's argument that the representation on the collective
federal Presidency made Kosovo a sovereign federal unit. Both Badinter Committee
and the European Community ignored this argument. See on the argument: "Letter by
the Government of the Republic of Kosovo to the Extraordinary EPC Ministerial
Meeting in Brussels, 21 December 1991 at The truth about Kosovo (1993) edited by
Academy of the Sciences of the Republic of Albania, Institute of History, Tirana:
Encyclopedia Publishing House, p. 329
17
principle in border definition, based on the procedures used by the
UN in the case of post-colonial settlements. Accordingly, the
borderlines of the Republics in the framework of the Federation were
preserved. This solution brought in attention the issue of ethnic and
minority groups within the Republics, including the autonomous
regions, such as Krajina in Croatia, and Voyvodina and Kosovo in
Serbia. The group rights were going to be guaranteed by the
constitution of each Republic under the provisions of ethnic and
minority rights. So, Kosovo was left under the authority of the
Republic of Serbia that was going to look at its own interests and
security and of its own constituents first and foremost. When the
Dayton Agreement was reached, it did not include any
predisposition for Kosovo. Considering Kosovo as an internal matter
of Serbia the concern for the Albanian rights was expressed at the
"Outer Wall of Sanctions" document, preconditioning the lifting of the
embargo with the respect of human rights in the remaining Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (UN.Doc.S/1995/999/1995).
This attitude of the international community led to the
radicalization of the situation in Kosovo. On one hand, radical
groups on the Albanian political circles believed that the peaceful
policy of Rugova was not going to be led to independence - only
violence could succeed in wining international recognition. Endless
discussions of "preventive diplomacy" and "early mechanisms" did
not solve any thing. This was the psychological basis for the
emergence of the Kosovo Liberating Army (KLA). The KLA was the
fuse that led to the explosion, especially among the rural areas.
(Zajovic, 1997:11-14) On the other hand, the Serb authorities found
in KLA a legitimate pretext for brutally unlawful measures. It was
used by Milosevic to provoke widespread Albanian uprising and than
to go on with the war and justify the ethnic cleansing and genocide
at terrific dimensions. (Maliqi, April 1998). The massacre in Drenica,
in the beginning of March 1998,where some 80 Albanians were
killed, among them 25 women and children, foreordained for the
seven months of open war.
4.2. Debating interventions on paper
The conflicts in the Balkans witnessed the complexity of the
quest for security as well of the linkage between state, societal and
human security. (Møller 2000:33) Accordingly human rights
violations occurring within the borders of a sovereign state, "which
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are large enough to warrant the attention of the international society,
are a priory large enough to represent a threat to international peace
and security" (Ryan, 1997:95). The UN Secretary-General Javier
Perez de Cuellar discusses this issue since 1991 in his annual
report. He stated:
"It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference
with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights
could be violated systematically with impunity… the case for
impinging on the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political
independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it
would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that
sovereignty….includes the right of mass slaughter or of
launching systematic campaigns of decimation or of forced
exodus of civilian population in the name of controlling civil
strife or insurrection" (De Cuellar, 1991:5).
The danger of war widening and the memories of Bosnia
promoted the governments of Western countries governments and
the US reaction after a 10-years "patterns of neglect" (Kaplan,
October 1998:747). Up to that moment neither the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union
(EU), the United Nations (UN) nor individual great powers had
adopted or even formulated a strategy or policy for Kosovo. Instead
they all kept repeating their deep concern for the violation of human
right and what was happening in Kosovo (Troebst, 1999:51-52).
The international community tried to react against Milosevics
regime first with negotiations and then with military intervention as a
compelling mean believing that this will stop the policy of violence,
but without result. Consequently, the NATO air campaign "Allied
Force" began on 24 March 1999. In response to NATO intervention,
the Serb genocide and expulsion of the population form the territory
of Kosovo accelerated. Only after 77 days of an air campaign and
strong diplomatic pressure, Miloscievic decided to withdraw
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. On 10 June the UN Security Council
passed with a score of 14 in favor and one abstention (China) the
resolution 1244, welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia of the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo
crisis, including an immediate end of the violence and an immediate
withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces.  At the same
time the Security Council decided to deploy international civil and
security presence in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices.
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Actually, Kosovo is technically a province within the legal framework
of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. "It
is neither a self-governing state, nor currently being governed by the
sovereign state" (Pugh, 2000: 15). The Serb and Kosovar Albanian
point of view concerning the future of Kosovo seems to be too far
apart to be bridged by any compromise solution. The reason for this
is that ten years of repression culminating in a brutal conflict have
convinced virtually all Kosovars that they cannot remain in the same
state as the Serbs. Moderate Kosovars, including Rugova and
publisher Veton Surroi, have pointed this out on more than one
occasion. Many Serbs have drawn a similar conclusion (RFE/RL
Balkan Report, 5 December 2000). However, the status of Kosovo is
not explicitly defined in any international documents. Its final version
is still pending on the tables of world diplomacy, shadowed by the
reluctance over reconciling the principle of sovereignty with that of
self-determination in international law and practice.
The whole complexity of circumstances that accumulated in
the Kosovo case, moving from broad security dilemmas to human
right infringement, made humanitarian intervention a necessity.
Humanitarian Interventions can be defined as "the non consensual
use of force to prevent or stop large scale killings contemplated or
carried out by the government of targeted state against its own
citizens or groups belonging to discernible authority in situations of
near or total anarchy" (Andreopoulos, 2000). Interventions to protect
civilians from acts of violence that shock the human conscience
have been a subject since the ancient times. Nevertheless, such
interventions are a subject of discussion attributed to the lack of
well-defined criteria of legitimacy that are a reflection of the
controversies between sovereignty and individuals and community
rights defined in other terms as self-determination.
In the present UN Charter there is not any explicit provision
that speaks out for the protection and the enforcement of the human
rights. In Chapter 1, Article 1(3) of the UN charter international
community of states is committed only for the promotion and
encouragement of human and fundamental rights. In face to face
confrontation between the individuals and the state, the state is the
one that can be trusted all the time. Nevertheless, crimes against
humanity that are not condemnable at the national level can be
condemned at the international level. The Article 2(7) of the first
Chapter and the Chapter VII of the Charter opens the way for
international interventions of a humanitarian nature only with the
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permission of the Security Council. This conditional closure in most
of the cases prevented humanitarian intervention from taking place.
Inherent internal state tensions remained silent after World War II,
bi-polarity took care of their management. In the communist part,
ideology replaced nationalism and the external threat strengthened
the national cohesion. The end of the Cold War opened a new page
in the history of humanitarian intervention. The Security Council
Resolution 688 (dealing with the case of Iraq) opened the way for
such interventions with out the permission of the targeted country. It
reflects a mixture of legality and legitimacy by practice.
On the other hand, the aim of humanitarian intervention is not
only to prevent the conflict but also to stop its reoccurrence. In such
a case, it is a complex process that involves two stages: stop the
fighting and return to normality.  It is obvious that the intervention to
stop the conflict is an important determinant on the success or the
failure of the stabilizing processes in the aftermath of the conflict. In
general terms, the nature of the international interventions is
affected by the quest for legitimacy borrowed in the present time
from the legitimization of democratic governance in the international
realm that at the end shapes the last aim of these interventions
when entering the stabilizing processes.
Intervention needs a strategy that should assure the
accommodation of the international institutions and the cooperation
of the parties directly involved in the peace building process. The
cohesion of these factors is indispensable since the international
community can propose but not impose, and even less substitute for
them. For a successful outcome, the strategy of interventions
warrants a balance between the goals of the parts involved in the
conflict, and the requirements of the system and the means used to
promote one's interests. Not rarely stabilizing processes are used as
means instead of strategy. And some time they can return to
strategy of corruption as the Bosnia case revealed recently.
(Friedman, 2001)
The intervention in Kosovo was made in the name of human
dignity.  Nevertheless, the strategic goal of intervention is not clear,
and there is reluctance in spelling out explicitly the future status of
Kosovo. There is a Security Council Resolution 1144 that commits
all “Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and reaffirm “substantial autonomy
and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo” (1999). In first
reading the resolution, it implies the reconstruction of Kosovo as
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forever being part of Yugoslavia. In fact the usage of the terms
“sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” should be judged in a large
context implying the respect for human rights up to the international
standards that does not take sides. The concept of sovereignty
incorporates the peoples as sovereigns, which means that the state
should respect the peoples rights to decide how should be governed
and from whom. This dichotomy in interpretation is reflected as a
disharmony between international community policy and Kosovar
Albanians aspirations. As far as the international community is
concerned, the concept of national sovereignty and territorial
integrity takes precedence over the right to self-determination, which
is interpreted loosely because of the difficulty in determining the
principle to observe when there are many allegiances and positions
difficult to reconcile. The reality of the post-Dayton situation has in
Bosnia weakened the credibility of solutions based on the integration
of broad multi-ethnic entities in favor of the principle of the
separation of the communities on ethnic or religious bases such as
the cases in Cyprus and Ireland (Clement, 1997:26). This reality
seems to favor fragmentation versus integration, a concept which
goes partly in line with the Kosovar demands, even if in the extreme
case this leads to independence.
In practical terms this confusion brings misperceptions and
deadlock situations expressed in the concerns of U.S. Ambassador
to the UN Richard Holbrooke "In the interim, I can't imagine anybody
walking away from a situation [in Kosovo] because otherwise you'd
have a war again. But nobody wants to stay in the Balkans forever.
We're looking for a way to phase out. We don't want another
situation like Korea where 47 years later we still have 40,000 troops
there." (15 December 2000).
5. Future prospects instead of conclusions
The end of the war in Kosovo will not
automatically give way to a positive era.
Without a comprehensive and fresh policy
approach the best outcome will be stalemate
and stagnation, and the worst outcome a
continuous decent into renewed conflict,
chaos and impoverishment (Declaration
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adopted by “Europa South-East” on July 20,
1999).
If the West fails to follow through on a
multi-year, focused effort to help
Southeastern Europe reap the benefits of
peace and democracy, we should not be
surprised to see a new Milosevic arise,
whether in Serbia or elsewhere in the region,
exploiting people's fears and disappointment
and unleashing yet another Balkan conflict. If
that happens through our neglect, we will
have only ourselves to blame (Moore, 15
October 2000).
5.1. Theoretical background on prospecting peace
The theoretical guiding framework on peace perspectives of
intra-state conflicts reflects ambiguity in understand the changing
nature of conflict and order in the Post-Cold Era, while defining the
factors and actors that are at stage and their inter-relationship
reveals to be more difficult. The understanding of societal security
concept should serve as "a kind of analytical lens, able to give an
insight into familiar problems. Like all lenses it gives a partial view,
making some things clearer others into the background" (Buzan,
1993: 185).
Learning from the way the crisis in Central America were dealt,
the problems that affect a region could be tackled on a regional
bases and not on a country by country basis since the various
countries’ problems have common origins, which are often deeply
rooted in their common history. Furthermore, the solutions to the
region's problems should be considered inter-related. These issues
include promoting democracy, advancing the causes of human
rights and civil society, speeding economic recovery and
development, and guaranteeing security. (Kissinger- quoted at
RFE/RL Balkan Report, 8 June 1999)
Democratic regime theory offers a comprehensive approach in
canalising causal factors such as national interest and power
dominance through regulatory bodies that will modify the outcome in
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the common interest with long-lasting effects. The case of the
European Union supports the argument. In Krasner terms regimes
constitute “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a
given area of international relations” (1982:185). They represent
well-defined guides to actors “actions or standards setting forth
actions that members are expected to perform (or not to perform)
under appropriate circumstances” (Young, 1982:334). The emphasis
here is placed on the “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal
and informal” (Keohane, 1990:732), that serve as guidelines for
actors behaviour. For Keohane & Nye the existence of a regime in a
given issue enhances cooperation among the parties because it
provides “sets of governing arrangements” that “regularise
behaviour and control its effects” (1977:19). Under such
circumstances, the building of democratic institutions also have an
important role to play on ensuring adherence to the rules by
formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting,
legitimating and adapting them (Bull, 1977:54).  Regimes are
applicable to all domains of international relations and the
effectiveness of regimes depends on their internal characteristics
and internal mechanisms that mitigate the concerns about the
distribution of gains (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 2000:15-
14).
By working in a regime based on democratic values states feel
free in their identities and confident in their neighbors, that makes
them more confident in providing more autonomy to the sub-national
groups (Talbott, 2000). Furthermore, the main causes that lead to
the creation of the European Union does not exist any more but the
regime persists and states are willing to comply with it. The regime
of norms and principles is customized and has gained legitimacy,
and the interests of states are represented at the level of the
Community (Deutch 1957). States “conceive themselves to be
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another,
and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 1977:13). At
this stage, regimes assume an independent power life of their own
apart from the initial conditions that facilitated their creation and
shaped the patterns of behavior.  The continuation is the pursuit of
the regime adjusting itself to the new conditions. In this regard it
contributes to the consolidation of peace stability and prosperity
based on the establishment of bonds of trust between individuals,
social groups and countries in the region.
24
Creating the right democratic institution is considered as a
step forwards towards peace building in torn out post war societies.
International institutions are “relatively stable collections of
communicative practices and rules defining appropriate behavior for
specific groups of actors in specific situations of international life”
(Risse-Kappen, 2000:14). There are two important moments for the
institutions: rules and norms that establish the institutions in paper
and being in life of the institution through practice processes that
speaks for actors expectations convergence and affects their
behavior. And societal actors preferences are at the starting point in
explaining institution building (Moravscsik, 1997). Institutions do not
just reduce transaction costs or provide rules of appropriate
behavior. They also serve as discourse arenas enabling deliberative
processes geared towards problem solving. They do it in part by
establishing relationship of trust among actors, which are deemed
crucial for processes of communicative persuasion and consensus
seeking (Risse-Kappen, 2000). Institutions can pattern interactions
between states and societies representing the wellspring of new
normative structures, identities, and interests that are more
collective and less particularistic if they consider precipitating factors
that encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction
and coordinate their policies in the light of relationship combined
with the ‘structural’ elements of power and ideas, and the ‘process’
elements of transactions, international organizations, and social
learning. The dynamic, positive and reciprocal relationship between
these variables leads to the development of trust and collective
identity formation (Adler and Barnet, 1998).
Institutions and institutional change are dependent variables
depending on knowledge and argumentative discourses. The
question is which logic of interaction is likely to prevail in which
situation and under what conditions. Institutions aim the status quo
preservation in the international system neglecting distributional
effects that affects the efficiency of the institutions in peace building
processes. The questions is not if institutions matter but how do they
matter? Under which conditions, promises theoretical, empirical and
practical payoff. (Martin, 1997)
The interaction between international norms and institutions on
the one hand and domestic politics on the other hand is not yet
covered extensively by the literature. Domestic political factors and
their effect on shaping state preferences and other dimensions of
state policy towards institutions (Moravcsik, 1995; Goldstein, 1996)
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offer a part of the understanding but does not transcend state
lenses. There is more done on the direction of role of regimes on the
domestic discourses (Muller, 1995) than vice versa.
The pacifying effects of democracy and its institutions are
empirically strong but “it is long way from being perfect, and is in fact
so modest in strength according to most of the techniques utilized to
evaluate it that it is sometime of a minor miracle that it has yet to be
eliminated by most of the ‘controls’ to which it has been introduced”.
(Ray, 1997:14) “The ontology of the regimes rest upon element of
intersubjectivity” (Kratochvil and Ruggie, 1986:764) implying
compliance of all agents involved, formalized or not. The concept is
important because it transcends the state borders and focuses on
the concept of group and purposeful cooperation. The concept
includes the understanding of political culture as “the collective self-
understanding of actors in a given society that are stable over time.
It defines their collective identity as a nation and, thus, provides
them with a repertoire of interpretations of a reality as well as
appropriate behavior.” (Risse-Kappen, 1995:21)
Accordingly, "peoples act not on the basis of objective reality
but on the basis of perceived reality and of assumed cause-and-
effect relationships operating in the world they perceive. And people
act not only on the basis of objective needs but also on the basis of
preferences reflecting their subjectively defined interests and
normative convictions of how it is right or good or appropriate to act
under the circumstances. International actions, in other words,
cannot be described and explained without reference to the
subjective ‘meaning’ that this action has for the actors in question”.
Intersubjectivity and cognition effect the question of choice and
efficiency of institutions. (Scharpf, 1997, 19)
5.2 Prospects for the Balkans and Kosovo from an
empirical perspective
Working out a regime based on democratic norms and values
is considered as the best approach for the Balkans. This judgment is
based in two arguments: first, the small units are not viable and
second, drawing clear dividing lines based in ethnicity especially in
the Balkans is practically impossible. The Stability Pact for South
Eastern Europe represents the European Union’s main mechanism
for the stability and integration of the region into European
structures. “Lasting peace and stability in South Eastern Europe will
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only become possible when democratic principles and values, which
are already actively promoted by many countries in the region, have
taken root throughout, including in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia”(Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 10 June 1999).
Stress is placed in the creation of a sustainable regime based on
democratic values, respect for human and minority rights and the
development of multilateral and bilateral cooperation based on the
convergence of the interests, and aiming to foster social inclusion
and cohesion that will lead to regional integration.
The Stability Pact has no resources of its own; it merely keeps
the region on the EU’s agenda. Three working tables at regional
level will carry out the whole endeavor, coordinated by a High Level
Steering Group7 that is working out a regional assistance strategy
that will provide for economic reconstruction, stabilizing reform and
development of the South-East European Region. The Pact is
supposed to assumes the combination of three assumptions that are
considered important for the maintenance of social order: exchange
relations, threat system and image integration (Boulding, 1989).
Exchange relations presume the development of a sustainable
economic environment based on fostering economic and trade
relations aiming at the convergence of economic interests. Threat
system is based on an external soft deterrence related with financial
aid and conditional integration in the EU and other Western
institutions. Image integration will provide for the harmonization of
the perceptions and interests based on the development of
confidence, trust and security measures that are the result of an
enhanced multi-dimensional intercourse environment.
The aftermath process in Kosovo is a mixture of different
policies that at the end aim to provide a sustainable solution to the
Kosovo question. First of all the international community is working
for a consolidation of internal democratic balance in the region as a
                                                
7 The High Level Steering Group (HLSG) is co-chaired by Messrs Pedro Solbes,
European commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and James D.
Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank. Its membership includes the Finance
ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the
United States and Portugal (representing the Presidency of the European Union), as
well the Managing Director of International Monetary Fund, the President of the
European Investment Bank and the President of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact of South-Eastern
Europe, and the Deputy-Secretary-General of the United Nations. In addition, a number
of development Ministers, as well as the Finance Minister of the Netherlands and the
representative of the UN Mission in Kosovo are associated to the deliberations of the
HLSG.
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legitimation, if not an additional guaranty for the credibility of the
process. On the other hand with the arrival of moderate leaders in
leadership, both in Kosovo and Serbia, a policy of rapprochement
and dialogue is envisaged followed by policies that aim at reducing
tensions and gradual confidence building.  All these policies intend
to moderate the request for self-determination as a precaution for
avoiding fragmentation at a regional level. In the long –term an
integration at the regional level supported by the adoption of strong
measures to protect minority rights seems likely to solve the
Balkans' problems.
The philosophy behind such a policy is based in the healing
values of democracy. This is done in the belief that democracy has
transformed the nature of the nation-state “giving way to a new
system in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in
their neighbourhoods to make a virtue out of porous borders and
intertwined economies and cultures”(Talbott, 2000:155). It has well-
developed mechanisms for opening borders and societies,
protecting minorities, empowering regions, pursuing trans-national
cooperation, and promoting the principle that differences in
language and culture can be a source of strength rather then of
division. In this regard it contributes to the consolidation of peace
stability and prosperity based on the establishment of bonds of trust
between individuals, social groups and countries in the region.
The success of the politics based on those theoretical
guidelines depends on many factors. First of all it depends on the
willingness of the internal factors to cooperate and be flexible
towards the recommendation. Another important incentive is the
willingness of the international actors to maintain a sustained
commitment on the region and not act only when a crisis blows up.
Imposed frameworks have been characterised by Beatrice Pouligny
as failing to capture, articulate or modify the routine communal and
network negotiations that actually shape the societal concerns
(Autumn 2000). Moreover, the international community’s attention
to, and investments in, “elections, repatriation and measurable
macro economic stability projects on the one hand, stands in
marked contrast to the limited investment in qualitative social and
civil society programs on the other. Concepts of political
accountability and representation have made little headway (Pugh,
2000:17) in the region and in Kosovo in particular.  The main
problem as identified by Garton Ash “is the sheer lack of political
will-that we are prepared to spend $13 billion to fight the war in
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Kosovo but we haven’t been prepared to spent $2 billion to secure
the peace (April 2000).
May be the time has come to give more space to the ignored
voices and show the political courage to absorb all we have been
going through during this conflict, to recognize all that has changed
and to adapt to all that is about to change again. The breach
between the Albanian and Serb communities is manifested as a
struggle over power and identity that in turn acts as a critical
intervening variable between external factors and internal formal-
institutional outcomes. The interaction between the communities
within Serbia and Kosovo as part of this struggle reveals a playing
according to the imposed rules while advocating certain democratic
commitments and practices while undermining many others
according to the actors interests and preferences. Democracy
matters when communities share the commitment to its values.
Communities, Serb and Albanian, have accentuated the identity
patterns of differentiation through processes and institutions. The
last war accentuated ethnic identity and deepened hatred.
Promoting a self-sustained democracy in such an environment is
very difficult almost impossible at least in a lifetime. Democracy
means the willingness to have your group to outvote and have
power to go to the competing group or party. This needs trust and
confidence that nothing threatening will come from a change in
power. And this is hard to achieve after a war of attrition (Friedman,
2001).
The self-determination of Kosovo would help the
democratization of Serbia that is in line with the international
community's objectives. In this way the Serbs will be able to
establish a state without national problems, national hatreds and
Serbophobia. Serbs have to concentrate the country’s energies on
the immense tasks facing them at home and let the others do the
same. Nations in the Balkans have to learn to live side by side with
each other through creating, reproducing, and changing the culture
of conflict by way of learning to appreciate and respect each other in
the building of a common home for everyone.
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